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Abstract 
This paper summarizes historical developments in Japan’s legal treatment of firms’ invention 
remuneration policies and examines the impact of such policies on R&D performance using original 
data from surveys including the 2005 IIP Invention Remuneration Survey, the 2007 RIETI Inventor 
Survey and its 2008 follow-up survey. Tracking the linkages between remuneration policy and R&D 
performance is complicated by Japanese firms’ reluctance to reveal the details of their policies to 
their employees before the 2004 amendment of Japan’s Patent Law. By matching the data from 
firm-level and individual-level surveys, we find that nearly 40% of inventors believed that their firms 
did not have revenue-based remuneration although their employers reported they actually had 
instituted such policies. We estimate the effect of revenue-based remuneration policies on R&D 
performance using two policy variables for the incidence of contingent remuneration policies, one of 
which depends on the firms’ responses and the other on individual employees’ survey responses. Our 
project-level or patent-level productivity measures include the number of patents generated from a 
project, inventors’ subjective evaluation of their patents’ economic value, and indicators of whether 
the patent was used commercially. After taking measures to eliminate estimation bias, such as the 
propensity score matching method and instrumental variable estimation, we find no evidence that the 
prospect of greater monetary compensation is affecting the quantity or quality of patents or the 
likelihood of their commercialization except for a sample of those who rated the importance of 
monetary rewards as “not unimportant”, from whom we obtain weak evidence of the real impact of 
monetary incentives. 
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Introduction 
The 2004 amendment of Section 35 of Japan’s Patent Law caused many Japanese firms to revise 
their remuneration policies for employee inventions and boost payouts to inventors. The most 
significant change, however, was the firms’ decision to greatly increase the disclosure of their 
policies to employees. A director of the intellectual property rights office of a Japanese electronic 
machinery manufacturer said: 
“In 2005 when the law was revised, we held a series of meetings to explain our 
remuneration policy for employees’ inventions to all employees. We were given a 
roster of all employees and checked their attendance and, if necessary, arranged 
one-to-one meetings to make sure that everyone received an explanation. Since the 
law requires “consultation” with the employees, we created a special email address to 
receive their inquiries and comments. Since 2005, we have held an information 
session for new employees every year including a 30-page PowerPoint presentation 
that explains the Patent Law, describes the legal treatment of employees’ inventions, 
and provides a detailed explanation of the formulae used to determine remuneration 
levels. Furthermore, all the information including the formal provisions and a 
two-page summary is available for viewing on our intranet, therefore anyone can see 
it whenever they want.” 
Before the amendment, as we show later, many firms did not reveal the details of their 
remuneration policies to employees. Since many inventor-employees did not precisely know whether 
or how much remuneration they would receive prior to developing their inventions, it is conjectured 
that many employee-inventors perceived remuneration as windfalls.    Employees’ uncertainty 
regarding payouts blurred the relationship between monetary incentives and inventive productivity in 
the pre-amendment period because compensation policy should have an impact only when rewards 
are anticipated. Although it is quite clear that judicial decisions provided the impetus to amend the 3 
 
Patent Law, the amendment’s impacts on inventor behavior, inventive efforts, and productivity are 
less obvious for these reasons.   
The purpose of the paper is to explain what led to the amendment of the law, to discuss why 
there has been a tendency to downplay the role of invention remuneration, and to explore what kinds 
of effects the invention remuneration policies had in the pre-amendment period. 
The Patent Law defines an "employee invention" as an invention that falls within the scope of 
the employer’s business that was developed through an employee’s actions performed to fulfill a 
duty to the employer. The rights and liabilities arising from employee inventions are governed by 
Section 35 of the Patent Law. Section 35 assigns the right to an employee invention to the employee, 
but stipulates that: (1) the employer shall receive a non-exclusive license (i.e., the shop right) without 
paying compensation (as in the U.S.); and (2) an employee who vests the right to obtain a patent or 
the patent right in the employer shall have the right to receive a reasonable remuneration (as in 
Germany) in accordance with any agreement, employment regulation or any other stipulation. Before 
2005, Section 35 further provided that the amount of such remuneration should be decided by 
reference to the “amount of profits made by the employer from the invention” and “the contribution 
made by the inventor.” However, unlike German patent law, there has been no clear standard for 
calculating “reasonable remuneration” in Japan. This ambiguity caused many firms to assume for a 
long time that whatever amount of compensation they awarded in accordance with their policies 
should be regarded as “reasonable” regardless of whether the inventor-employees agreed with it or 4 
 
not.  
Although there are a variety of compensation plans implemented by Japanese firms, a typical 
plan consists of two parts: (1) fixed, nominal payment at the time of filing a patent application or 
patent registration, and (2) contingent, revenue-based payment when inventions actually generate 
value, e.g., realized sales, profits, or royalty income. The latter may be a percentage of sales revenue 
or a fixed amount of money paid out when a performance measure achieved a certain milestone. 
Some plans have upper limits to payouts per year or per patent. 
Until recently, many Japanese firms would pay inventors only a nominal amount of 
compensation at the time of patent filing or registration (i.e., only part (1) of the above typical plan). 
For instance, in the questionnaire survey conducted by the Japan Institute of Invention and 
Innovation in 1986, which covers 300 companies chosen at random from among the top 800 
companies in terms of the number of patent applications filed, 93.3% of firms had implemented 
compensation plans based on filing or registration, whereas only 60.1% had compensation plans 
based on revenue from patents. The data indicate that even among companies that actively filed 
patent applications, one-third paid only a nominal amount of compensation. 
Furthermore, most Japanese firms did not allocate sufficient resources to ensure that their 
employees understood their remuneration policies. According to the firm survey conducted by the 
Institute of Intellectual Property in 2002, only 17% of Intellectual Property (IP) managers believed 
that their employees “largely understand their invention remuneration policy” or “know what types 5 
 
of remuneration exist in their firm” (JPO 2003). The rest believe that their employees are not well 
informed regarding their remuneration policy (see Table 1). At the same time, in answering the 
question “What is the purpose of revenue-based remuneration for employee inventions,” nearly 90% 
of the same IP managers chose “in order to encourage employee inventions” as the second most 
important reason after “because Section 35 of the Patent Law requires it.” If remuneration plans are 
implemented as incentive schemes, why don’t firms try harder to familiarize their employees with 
these plans?   
Despite their claims, it seems clear to us that the employers had a tendency to play down the 
incentive effects of their invention remuneration policies until recently. They had created such 
policies primarily to comply with Section 35. This widespread passivity may indicate either that 
firms believed their remuneration policies did not have much incentive effect (possibly due to small 
payouts and long time lags between filings and payouts) or that they were concerned about some of 
the downsides to invention remuneration. That such ambivalence could be observed in most Japanese 
firms’ treatment of invention remuneration raises doubts about whether monetary compensation for 
employee inventions has had any impact on inventive effort or productivity. The changes in the 
Patent Law should also be evaluated in this context. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the history of the legal treatment 
of employee inventions. Section 3 discusses possible downsides to remuneration policies for 
employee inventions. Section 4 presents the research questions we investigate in this paper and 6 
 
section 5 explains the datasets we use in our analyses. Section 6 presents our estimation results and 
section 7 summarizes our findings. 
 
1  Historical Development of Japanese Patent Law 
1.1  Employee Inventions   
The Japanese patent system was established in 1885 when the government issued an ordinance 
on exclusive licenses and established the Patent Office.
1 Legal provisions for employee inventions 
first appeared in the 1909 amendment to the Patent Law which stipulated that the patent right to 
employee inventions basically belonged to their employers. The 1921 amendment (Section 14) 
reversed the assignment of rights, stating that employee inventions basically belonged to the 
inventors while firms should have non-exclusive rights to use their employees’ inventions. The 
revised law further required that, in order to obtain the exclusive right to use these inventions, a firm 
must pay a “reasonable remuneration” to the inventors who transferred their patent rights to their 
employers. This provision was converted into Section 35 without substantial modification at the time 
of the revision of the Patent Law in 1959 and remained in place until 2005.   
1.2  The Limited Role of Section 35 
Despite the legal requirement to compensate employees for their inventions, a survey of the 
                                                 
1 Japanese  government  initially  enacted  Provisional Regulations for Exclusive Licenses, its first patent law, in 1871. 
However, the enforcement of this law was suspended the following year primarily because of the lack of administrative 
capacity including a shortage of patent examiners. 7 
 
member firms of the Enterprises' Industrial Property Rights Association (currently the Intellectual 
Property Rights Association) conducted by the Japan Patent Office in 1956 revealed that roughly 
one-third of respondents did not have any provisions for invention remuneration, indicating that a 
substantial number of actively patenting firms did not have any formal compensation plans for 
employee inventions. Section 35 did not specifically require firms to have formal provisions for 
remuneration, and it is hard to imagine that inventor-employees could demand more compensation 
for their inventions without risk to their careers. We assume that inventor-employees did not receive 
any cash remuneration in firms where such plans were not formally offered even after the 1959 
revision of the Patent Law.  
Although a gradually increasing number of firms implemented remuneration policies in the next 
few decades, the amount paid to inventors continued to be small. As we noted earlier, the survey 
conducted by the Japan Institute of Invention and Innovation in 1986 shows that the 93.3% of the 
three hundred actively patenting firms surveyed had instituted invention remuneration at the time of 
patent filing or registration, whereas only 60.1% had compensation plans based on patent revenues 
from sales or royalties. This indicates that one-third of companies that actively filed patent 
applications were paying only a nominal amount of compensation in the mid-1980s. For decades, 
business leaders believed that their firms would be judged to be paying “reasonable” remuneration 
and fully complying with the Patent Law if they had implemented formal provisions for invention 
remuneration, regardless of the amount to be paid, because employees had implicitly accepted the 8 
 
provisions by agreeing to work for the firm. 
It was only in the late 1990s that Japanese firms started beefing up their remuneration provisions 
in response to: (1) the increasing perception that utilizing and defending its own intellectual property 
rights could reinforce a firm’s competitive advantage; (2) the 1998 Amendment to the Patent Law 
that raised the value of patents by shortening the time it took to receive a patent and by making it 
easier to obtain relief for patent infringement; and (3) several lawsuits over remuneration for 
inventions that were filed in the late 1990s, foreshadowing more conflicts between 
employee-inventors and employers in the following decade. According to a survey of 347 
manufacturing firms listed on the Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya stock exchanges conducted by Onishi 
(2010), the number of firms with revenue-based compensation increased from 199 (57.3%) in 1995 
to 299 (86.2%) in 2005 (see Figure 1). 
1.3  Increase in Legal Battles between Employers and Employees 
The trend of increasing remuneration for inventions accelerated after the defendant firm lost in 
the Olympus case,
2  in which an inventor demanded additional compensation despite the fact that his 
employer had already paid him in accordance with its remuneration policy. The Tokyo High Court 
(2001) and the Supreme Court (2003) held that the compensation plan that Olympus had unilaterally 
determined did not provide “reasonable remuneration” and was therefore invalid. The courts also 
held that, irrespective of the existence of a compensation plan, the final authority to decide the 
                                                 
2  This case was filed at the Tokyo District Court in 1995 and the first judgment was delivered in 1999. 9 
 
appropriate amount of remuneration was vested in the courts.   
The Supreme Court ruling in this case encouraged many other inventors to file suits seeking 
additional compensation for their inventions. Figure 2 shows the rise in the number of lawsuits filed 
by employee-inventors in district courts from 1990 through 2007 that had been decided as of 
November 2008. There is an obvious increase after 2001 despite the truncation problem. Furthermore, 
in these cases the courts tended to order employers to pay large amounts of compensation.
3 In this 
new legal environment, Japanese firms that had not adopted any revenue-based remuneration policies 
for employee inventions hurried to implement such plans.   
1.4  Amendment to Section 35 
The increase in lawsuits caused anxiety among Japanese firms because it increased the risks 
associated with R&D investment. Business leaders and policymakers agreed that litigation might 
negatively affect the businesses’ use of the patent system and their competitiveness in the global 
market. As a result, Section 35 was amended in 2004. Article 4 of the revised Section 35 provides 
that the payment of compensation in accordance with the predetermined remuneration plans would 
be deemed “reasonable” if: (1) a negotiation between the employer and the employee takes place in 
order to set standards for determining the award amount; (2) these standards are disclosed; and (3) 
                                                 
3  Nichia Corporation is the most famous of these cases. In 2004 a district court ordered Nichia Corporation to pay 
twenty billion yen to the inventor of a blue light-emitting-diode (LED). The firm and the inventor, Shuji Nakamura, 
eventually agreed on the payment of ¥840 million under a settlement coordinated by the Tokyo High Court. The amount 
is still the largest ever made to an employee of a company as compensation for an invention in Japan. 10 
 
the employees are consulted on the calculation of the amount of the award. 
This revision was intended to require the court to place more weight on procedural rationality 
rather than on the fairness of the amount of compensation. It is expected that once a court determines 
that a compensation plan was adopted through procedures that can be considered reasonable, the 
court cannot question the adequacy of the amount paid to the inventor unless circumstances change 
drastically or the invention in question generates profits much greater than what was expected. 
Article 5 of Section 5 was also revised to require courts to balance an inventor’s claim against 
the firm’s contributions to the invention. When a firm lacks a specific provision to determine the 
level of payment, the amount of the compensation shall be determined by taking into consideration: 
(1) the amount of profit to be received by the employer from the invention; (2) the employer's costs 
and contribution to the invention’s development; (3) treatment of the employee; and (4) any other 
circumstances relating to the invention. 
 
2  Discussion: Concerns About Invention Remuneration 
Before discussing the implications of the patent law changes for inventor behavior and 
productivity, we summarize the explanations for why many Japanese firms had been indifferent 
toward making employees aware of their remuneration plans. Note that, if firms had been reluctant to 
promote remuneration policies as a means to motivate employees for good reasons, the new legal 
requirement for disclosure and consultation could also have a downside.   11 
 
First, one possible concern is equitable treatment of other employees. Many large firms are 
diversified and the revenue shares of divisions vary. If remuneration is proportional to the revenue an 
invention generates, the researchers in large divisions would have an advantage. Furthermore, 
patenting inventions may be easier in some technological fields than in others, which could also lead 
to differences in remuneration. If gaps in remuneration payouts across divisions become substantial, 
those in disadvantaged divisions may become demoralized. Another consideration is the relationship 
between revenue and non-R&D departments. Successful commercialization often requires 
coordinated efforts across research, development, marketing, manufacturing, and sales departments. 
If the revenue generated is the result of this cooperation among departments, why would the firm 
only reward those in the research group? Maintaining equitable treatment may be desirable to 
encourage cross-functional cooperation and partnership. 
Second, management might be concerned about the problem that economists call the 
“multitasking agency problem” (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). Note that researchers might have 
important tasks other than invention such as safety testing, producing technical material for sales 
people and customers, briefing senior management, training new employees, etc. There are also 
important research activities that do not directly lead to patents or more revenue such as developing 
technical capabilities that will be valuable in the long run. Offering compensation schemes that 
depend only on the filing or registration of patents or the revenue generated may cause employees to 
distort their allocation of time, attention and energy away from the optimal allocation for the 12 
 
employer. For example, researchers may prefer not to involve new employees who need training 
because having more participants may dilute their share of remuneration if a project succeeds. 
Involving less experienced employees, however, may be indispensable to developing new talent and 
passing technical know-how to the next generation of researchers. 
Third, as Owan and Nagaoka (2010) discuss, extrinsic rewards such as remuneration may crowd 
out intrinsic motivation. This problem could be modeled as one similar to the multitasking agency 
problem. When presented with a compensation scheme that depends only on the success of the 
projects (i.e., patents and revenue), risk-averse agents may shift towards safer projects that are more 
likely to generate some patentable technology or focus more on incremental technological 
developments that are likely to be used in existing products. Such distortions are especially costly 
when researchers are already motivated intrinsically and pursuing risky, but potentially highly 
profitable, exploratory projects. 
If these concerns are real, management will face trade-offs. On one hand, insufficient 
remuneration reduces the incentive effect while raising the legal risk. On the other hand, paying 
generous remuneration might cause the abovementioned equity and distortion problems. The 
Institute of Intellectual Property survey offers some insights into firms’ expectations. Figure 3 shows 
the responses to the question, “What impacts do you expect when the amount of remuneration 
drastically increases?” It is clear from the survey results that many IP managers are concerned about 
greater inequity between researchers and non-R&D employees while some others also express 13 
 
concern about distracting highly motivated researchers, which is consistent with our earlier 
discussion. 
 
3  Research Questions 
In order to have an informed discussion about the issues discussed above, we need to study the 
relationship between remuneration policies, actual and perceived, and the R&D performance of 
inventors. Mapping this relationship is a very challenging task because the policies are never 
randomly assigned and there are many factors that could influence a firm’s decision to introduce or 
modify its remuneration practices. These confounding factors lead to estimation bias, the direction of 
which may not be obvious. In addition, there are a variety of remuneration policies and the impact of 
a policy should depend on its actual structure. Another complication is heterogeneity in how firms 
communicate their policies to their employees. Some firms may adopt a remuneration policy to 
comply with the letter of Patent Law but fail to allocate any managerial resources to informing their 
employees of the change. 
In the rest of this paper, we will address the following questions: 
  How well informed were inventor-employees of their firms’ invention remuneration plans 
before the 2004 amendment to the Patent Law? 
  How is the incidence of a certain type of remuneration policy or the accuracy of employees’ 
perceptions of their firms’ policies associated with industry, firm, and employee 14 
 
characteristics? 
  What effects do different types of remuneration policies have on R&D performance? 
The answers to the second question can be used to estimate the treatment effect examined in the 
third question. As noted above, simple regressions without randomized treatment typically lead to 
significant selection bias. If firms with certain characteristics tend to perform better and, at the same 
time, are more likely to adopt revenue-based remuneration policies, the correlation between the 
performance and the remuneration policies may be significantly positive even if the true causal effect 
is negligible. The actual sign of the bias, however, is not known a priori. 
While a number of studies have looked at the impact of monetary compensation on the inventive 
productivity of R&D researchers (see, for example, Honig-Haftel and Martin (1993) and Zenger and 
Lazzarini (2004)), the mechanism through which a pay scheme affects the inventive process has not 
been adequately scrutinized. In the case of the US market, generous invention remuneration may be 
necessary to retain star researchers, thus market pressure may force a firm to adopt a certain type of 
compensation for valuable inventions.    This pressure is less pronounced in Japan where the turnover 
rates of scientists and engineers are still low in a majority of industries. Owan and Nagaoka (2010) 
analyze how intrinsic and extrinsic motives including monetary incentives affect inventive 
productivity and find that intrinsic motives are far more important in explaining research output and 
quality. Onishi (2010) empirically analyzes the relationship between compensation policy type and 
research output at the firm level and finds that the introduction of revenue-based compensation 15 
 
policies did not enhance firms’ patent outputs. However, these studies do not explain why the new 
compensation policies did not affect inventors’ motivation. We attempt to fill that gap in this paper. 
 
4  Data 
4.1  Sources of data 
We combine two sources of data to examine our research questions. First, we employ 
inventor-level, patent-level, and project-level information from a survey of 5,091 Japanese inventors 
on 5,278 patents conducted by the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry in 2007 
(hereafter the RIETI inventor survey).
4 Roughly 70% of the observations come from a stratified 
random sampling of triadic patents--patents submitted simultaneously to patent offices in Japan, the 
US and Europe--while roughly 30% of the observations are a random sample of non-triadic patents. 
In addition to its richly detailed information on inventor, patent and project characteristics, the RIETI 
inventor survey makes available three measures of inventor productivity: (1) npat, the number of 
domestic patents the project produced or is expected to produce (a 6-point categorical variable); (2) 
pat_val, the economic value of the surveyed patent evaluated on a relative basis by the inventors 
themselves (a 4-point categorical variable); and (3) use, the incidence of commercial use of the 
patented technology including licensing and startups.   
Other survey findings that we use to control for heterogeneity in inventor, patent and project 
                                                 
4  For more detailed description of the RIETI inventor survey, see Nagaoka and Tsukada (2007) and Nagaoka and Walsh 
(2009). 16 
 
characteristics include gender, age, education background, and R&D affiliation of 
respondent-inventors, the number of inventors for the focal patent, the purpose, nature and stage of 
the project generating the patented technology, and the man-months allocated to the project (see 
Table 3). Additional unique pieces of information we include as control variables are subjective 
evaluations of sources of motivation.
5 These motivation variables are included because they are 
likely to be correlated with personal attributes and corporate culture, which in turn may be 
associated with firms’ decisions on remuneration policies.   
The second source of information is the firm-level survey on remuneration policies conducted by 
Koichiro Onishi, which was sponsored by the Institute of Intellectual Property in 2005 (hereafter the 
IIP firm survey).
6 The survey targeted 836 manufacturing firms listed on the first section of the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange as of March 31, 2005. Among the targeted firms, 360 firms responded to the 
questionnaire, a response rate of 43.1%. We use the data for 347 firms after excluding two firms that 
had not obtained any patents in the preceding 15 years and 11 firms that refused to answer some 
major questions. These data have two advantages. First, they provide a wealth of information on the 
remuneration policies of large Japanese firms including remuneration types (e.g., 
                                                 
5  These variables are the responses to the following question: “How important were each of the following factors as a 
source of motivation for your invention? (1) satisfaction from contributing to the progress of science and technology 
(mtvn_sci), (2) satisfaction from solving challenging technical problems (mtvn_chall), (3) enhancing your organization’s 
performance (mtvn_org), (4) career advancement and better job opportunities (mtvn_career), (5) reputation and prestige 
(mtvn_rep), (6) improved research conditions such as higher budgets (mtvn_budget), and (7) monetary rewards 
(mtvn_money). A 5-point Likert scale is used to answer each question (1=absolutely unimportant, 5=very important). 
6  For more detailed description of IIP firm survey, see Onishi (2006, 2010). 17 
 
filing/registration-based vs. revenue-based).
7  Second, the IIP questionnaire asks each firm about the 
details of its remuneration policies in 1990 and whatever changes that were made between 1990 and 
2005, when the survey took place. These details enable us to construct panel data on the evolution of 
remuneration policies for 347 major Japanese firms.   
We also used three additional sources of data. We supplemented the firm characteristics data by 
matching them with the results of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry’s annual Basic 
Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities. We also collected inventor-level accounts of 
their firms’ remuneration policies from the follow-up survey conducted by RIETI in the summer of 
2008 of those respondents to the RIETI inventor survey who provided their email addresses 
(hereafter RIETI II).  The IIP firm survey provides firm-level panel data on remuneration policies 
for employee inventions from 1990 through 2005 while RIETI II offers the inventors’ accounts of 
what remuneration policies they believed were in effect during the course of invention for the patents 
applied for from 1995 to 2002.
8 
As Table 2 shows, after matching the RIETI inventor survey with the IIP firm survey, our combined 
dataset has 2341 inventors working for 217 listed firms. The number of inventors working in the 
same firm ranges from 1 to 156 with a highly skewed distribution. The average is 10.8 inventors per 
firm. Since RIETI II covers only a portion of the original RIETI survey’s inventors, matching it with 
                                                 
7  Other information collected includes types of revenue measures (sales vs. licensing vs. transfer), types of patents the 
policy is based on (domestic vs. foreign), amount of payout limits, frequency of payouts, etc. 
8  If their remuneration policy changed during the research period, we asked inventors to identify the policy in effect 
during the time period when they made their most significant breakthroughs. We then selected the middle year of the 
period minus 1 year as the “matching” year for our comparison.   18 
 
the IIP firm survey substantially reduces our sample size. The list of variables we use in our analyses 
is presented in Table 3. 
4.2  Conflicting accounts from employers and employees on their remuneration plans 
We first examine how well the two sources of information coincide with each other. The 
matching results are presented in Table 4. When we look at the rate of discrepancies at the firm level, 
all employees at more than 90% of firms reported correctly whether their firms offered fixed payouts 
at the time of filing applications or registration. This high rate of accuracy is understandable given 
that most large Japanese firms had such policies in place for many decades and most inventors who 
had patented their inventions had already received such payouts. When we asked about 
revenue-based remuneration determined either by sales or royalties, however, some employees 
answered that such a policy did not exist at nearly 60% of the firms that actually had one. When we 
looked at discrepancies between perceptions and reality at the industry level, we did not see much 
variation across industries; 40-70% of employee-inventors in each industry failed to correctly 
identify the remuneration policies they were subject to. 
The firms surveyed should have little incentive to report untruthfully because the Institute of 
Intellectual Property, although funded by the government, is a think tank whose primary purpose is to 
conduct policy-oriented research on intellectual property and provide member firms with various IP 
databases. Given that the IIP does not have an enforcement or monitoring role, most of the 
discrepancies can be attributed to the inventors’ ignorance of their firms’ actual policies, although 19 
 
some discrepancies may be the result of inaccurate recollection by IP managers.   
There are a number of possible reasons why the accounts of employers and employees do not 
coincide. First, since a number of firms changed their remuneration policies at some point between 
1990 and 2005, depending on when an inventor believes the critical stage of his or her work took 
place, the perceived remuneration policy may be different from the one the IP manager believes to 
have been in effect during the matching year. But the discrepancies are not reduced much by 
allowing a longer time lag or excluding the firms that revised their policies. Second, the description 
of an actual remuneration policy may cause some employees to incorrectly believe that the policy is 
not partly based on revenue. For example, some firms pay remuneration when an invention realizes 
actual sales or licensing but the award amount is fixed and does not depend on the amount of revenue. 
Since we have the detailed information on firms’ remuneration policies, we can re-examine the data 
after excluding plans that may not be correctly perceived as revenue-based. Again, the discrepancy 
rate is not reduced much by the exclusion. 
Although this finding of prevalent inconsistencies between the accounts of the employers and 
the employees is certainly puzzling and disturbing, it is somewhat consistent with the 2002 survey 
conducted by the Institute of Intellectual Property which we mentioned in the introduction. Our data 
confirmed the earlier finding that employees are not offered much chance to learn the details of their 
remuneration policies even if provisions for revenue-based remuneration exist. 
Finally, note that almost all listed firms with substantial patent stock already had some 20 
 
filing/registration-based fixed remuneration policy in effect for decades. Only 10 out of 217 firms did 
not have any type of filing or registration-based fixed remuneration policies at some point during the 
years from 1990 to 2005. Since the responses on fixed payments do not have sufficient variation to 
allow any meaningful quantitative analyses, we will focus on revenue-based remuneration in the next 
section. 
 
5  Analysis 
5.1 What determines the incidence of revenue-based invention remuneration policies and 
their accurate identification by employees? 
Our first question is what types of firms are more likely to introduce revenue-based 
remuneration policies. The first two columns in Table 5 present random-effect probit estimation 
results for the firm-reported incidence of revenue-based remuneration using firm-year panel data 
from the IIP firm survey. We find that revenue-based remuneration policies are more common in 
larger firms with greater patent stock in the industries with the most lawsuits related to invention 
remuneration. The positive association between performance-based pay policy and patent stock may 
imply that providing researchers with monetary incentives is more important in such firms or that the 
risk of inventor lawsuits is greater in technology-oriented firms. The positive correlation between the 
incidence of revenue-based remuneration and the accumulated number of lawsuits in the same 
industry suggests that firms in an industry where lawsuits related to invention remuneration have 21 
 
been filed may be more alert to the legal risk and thus more likely to have revenue-based 
remuneration.  
As we have argued earlier, employees may not be motivated by the existence of revenue-based 
remuneration if they are not fully informed about the policy. We investigate whether the 
firm-reported or employee-reported incidence of remuneration policies affects the performance of 
R&D researchers. An employee’s recollection of the remuneration policy in place at the time of the 
invention should reflect the actual policy, the amount of resources their firm spent familiarizing their 
employees with the policy, and the employee’s interests in monetary rewards. Therefore, the 
perceived policy should depend on inventor characteristics as well as firm characteristics. This 
hypothesis is supported by the evidence. 
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 5 show that an employee’s identification of the employer’s 
revenue-based remuneration policy does depend on some of the inventor’s characteristics as well as 
the firm size. Since there is a prevalent tendency of “under-identification,” the results also illustrate 
who is more likely to know their remuneration policy accurately. Younger inventors who are 
motivated to improve organizational performance and secure better research conditions are less 
likely to know of the existence of a revenue-based remuneration policy although this tendency may 
also be a product of the firm’s practices. There are two major differences between the firm-reported 
and the employee-reported policy variables. First, the accuracy of employees’ perceptions is not 
correlated with the number of patent lawsuits in an industry, implying that increasing numbers of 22 
 
lawsuits may induce the firms to take defensive measures, i.e., adopt revenue-based remuneration, 
but without drawing their employees’ attention to their new “opportunities” to earn more money. 
Secondly, perceived policy accuracy is not correlated with patent stock value, implying that 
technology-oriented firms are more likely to adopt revenue-based remuneration but do not 
necessarily publicize it much, perhaps out of fear that monetary incentives may have negative 
repercussions. Another interpretation might be that technology-oriented firms attract intrinsically 
motivated people who do not pay much attention to what remuneration policy the employer has. 
However, this explanation is inconsistent with another finding, shown in Table 5, that the importance 
of an inventor’s interest in science as a source of motivation is not significantly correlated with their 
policy perceptions. The coefficient for the last motivational factor, mtvn_money, is not significant 
either. This result is somewhat puzzling because people should be more likely to regard money as a 
source of motivation in firms with revenue-based compensation policies.     
5.2  How are R&D performance measures associated with firm-reported and 
employee-reported remuneration policy measures? 
Since we have constructed three measures of inventive performance based on the RIETI inventor 
survey, it is natural to ask how the adoption of performance-based pay policy is associated with the 
inventive performance of employees. We ran ordered probit regression for the number of patents 
generated from the project (npat), the value of the patents (pat_val), and probit regression for 
commercialization (use). We also constructed binary variables of the above quantity and quality 23 
 
measures (npat2 and pat_val2: see Table 3 for definitions) for the purpose of comparing the results 
with those of the propensity score matching method discussed below. 
Tables 6 and 7 show the results for firm-reported and employee-reported incidence of 
filing/registration-based and revenue-based remuneration policies, respectively. The results show that 
neither the actual nor the perceived incidence of filing/registration-based invention remuneration is 
correlated with any of the performance measures, supporting our view that almost all large firms 
with substantial patent stock have had such policies for decades. There is also little variation in 
adoption once we control for the size of firms and their patent stock. We therefore focus on 
revenue-based remuneration. 
Table 6 shows that firms with a revenue-based remuneration policy are likely to produce more 
valuable patents but not necessarily more patents (at least in the ordered probit model that uses more 
information than the compressed binary variable in the probit model), or to commercialize inventions 
more frequently. The naïve interpretation of this result is that performance-based pay encourages 
inventors to tackle more challenging but potentially profitable technical problems thus leading to 
valuable patents. Another interpretation, however, is that the firms that have valuable R&D 
investment opportunities are more likely to adopt revenue-based remuneration to speed up the 
inventive process or reduce the risk of being sued, thus offering more rewards to productive 
inventors. 
The relationship between remuneration policy perceptions and performance measures shown in 24 
 
Table 7 gives us a slightly different picture. Inventors who believe they work under revenue-based 
remuneration policies are more likely to commercialize patented technology. Again, this might 
suggest that awareness of revenue-based remuneration policies encourages inventors to produce 
valuable patents and to put forth more effort to commercialize their inventions. However, such 
causality is not so easily justified because there are many confounding factors that could impose bias 
on the estimated coefficients.   
First of all, firms whose competitive advantage hinges on intellectual property and technical 
know-how may introduce more substantive revenue-based remuneration policies and allocate more 
managerial resources to familiarize their employees with these policies, resulting in greater employee 
recognition in firms with more valuable patents and a higher incidence of commercialization. Second, 
the inventors who generate more valuable patents and successful commercialization may devote 
more attention and time to understanding the remuneration policy adopted by their employers. In 
order to mitigate the selection bias caused by heterogeneity among treated and controlled subjects, in 
the following sections we attempt to estimate more accurate measure of impacts of the actual and 
perceived remuneration policies using the propensity score matching (PSM) method.   
5.3  Impact of revenue-based remuneration: propensity score matching method 
Probit modeling puts more weight on the firms or the employees of firms where the introduction 
of revenue-based remuneration is less warranted than those where revenue-based remuneration is 
taken for granted (i.e., the likelihood of the former having such a policy is around 50% vs. very high 25 
 
for the latter) like the ordinary least squared estimation model. One way to better estimate the causal 
impact of such a policy is to compare the impact of the treatment between firms that are as similar as 
possible. The propensity score matching model allows us to measure the difference in performance 
between firms that have the same propensity score with and without revenue-based remuneration. 
Table 8 compares the predicted probability increase of having revenue-based remuneration using 
the results from the PSM method and the original probit estimation, respectively. There are two 
notable differences. First, the effect of the firm-reported incidence of revenue-based remuneration on 
the value of patents is reduced and becomes less significant in the PSM than in the ordinary probit. 
Second, the impact of the perceived policy on commercialization becomes more salient and 
significant. This suggests that perceived revenue-based remuneration encourages employees to 
invent more technology with commercial applications. The PSM method, however, eliminates only a 
certain type of selection bias and cannot correct for biases caused by unobservable characteristics 
that affect both the choice of remuneration policy and R&D performance. Therefore, it is still 
possible that the inventors who expect their inventions to be commercially expend more effort to find 
out their firms’ remuneration policy.   
5.4  Impact of revenue-based remuneration: probit model with instrument variables 
To cope with this endogeneity, we attempt to estimate previous probit models with the 
instrumental method, using “recognition rate” as an instrumental variable. The recognition rate is the 
share of colleagues in the same firm who correctly reported they had a revenue-based remuneration 26 
 
policy.
9  This recognition rate should reflect the firm’s actual policy and its allocation of resources to 
familiarize its employees with the policy. Therefore, the recognition rate should be correlated with an 
employee’s perceived remuneration policy but is likely to be orthogonal to the error term in the 
probit model we estimate because the colleagues’ recognition of the firm’s policy is less likely to be 
affected by the employee’s research performance. In the results of the regression of perceived policy 
on instrumental variables, this variable is a highly significant but somewhat low R-square 0.25. 
Table 9 shows the results of the probit estimation with instrumental variables and indicates that 
the coefficient for the perceived remuneration policy variable is not significant for all research output 
variables. Most notably, its positive impact on commercialization disappeared, implying that the 
observed correlation between the perceived policy and the invention’s commercialization is not 
causal but rather is the result of heightened awareness of potential remuneration payouts after 
commercialization.  
Why do monetary incentives completely fail to induce additional innovation outputs? One 
explanation is that inventors are mostly motivated by intrinsic benefits rather than extrinsic rewards 
as suggested by Owan and Nagaoka (2010). In order to examine whether this explanation is 
consistent with the data, we finally estimate the same models as estimated above with a sub-sample 
composed of the inventors who do not view monetary rewards as unimportant (i.e., those who rated 
“the importance of monetary rewards as a source of motivation for doing the research project” 3 or 
                                                 
9  To use this variable effectively, our sample is limited to firms with more than two respondents. 27 
 
higher in the 5-point Likert scale in the Inventor Survey). These inventors are more likely to react to 
a revenue-based remuneration policy than others.   
Table 10 shows the estimation results for probit and IV probit model with this sub-sample. In the 
IV probit model, the coefficient for perceived remuneration policy is marginally significant for 
increasing commercialization of their patents. However the same coefficient is significantly negative 
for the value of the patent. These results are consistent with the argument in Owan and Nagaoka 
(2010) that monetary incentives may induce an inventor to select a safe and easily commercialized 
research project rather than a more challenging but potentially more valuable project, and therefore 
could cause a deviation from the most efficient outcome. The results are consistent with the view that 
monetary incentives affect only those who do not see monetary rewards as an unimportant source of 
motivation, but the effect could be counterproductive if the distortion in project selection is 
significant.  
 
6  Conclusion 
In this study, we summarize the historical development of the legal treatment of invention 
remuneration policies and examine the impact of such policies on R&D performance based primarily 
on the 2005 IIP Invention Remuneration Survey, the 2007 RIETI Inventor Survey, and its 2008 
follow-up survey. Tracing the linkage between firm policy and performance is complicated by 
Japanese firms’ unwillingness to publicize the details of their policies to their employees before the 28 
 
2004 amendment of Japan’s patent law. Our analysis shows that the firm-reported incidence of 
revenue-based remuneration is positively associated with the value of patents while the 
employee-reported incidence of revenue-based remuneration is positively associated with 
commercialization, although both coefficients are only marginally significant. Our analysis based on 
the propensity score matching (PSM) method shows that the firm-reported policy variable’s 
association with the value of patents disappeared once more accurate measures of the treatment 
effects are computed. On the other hand, the employee-reported perceived revenue-based 
remuneration remains positively associated with commercialization with greater significance 
implying that monetary incentives may be encouraging the inventors to put forth more effort to apply 
their patented technology to commercial use. The PSM method, however, does not allow us to rule 
out the possibility of reversed causality, namely that inventors who expect their inventions to be 
commercially used expend more effort to find out their remuneration policy. To correct for such bias, 
we have employed instrumental variable estimation and demonstrated that the employee-reported 
measure of perceived revenue-based remuneration had little impact on any of the inventive 
performance measures.   
Lastly, our estimates indicate that perceived revenue-based remuneration is significantly positive 
for commercialization but negative for valuable patents among the inventors who do not see 
monetary rewards as unimportant after controlling for selection bias. Namely, revenue-based 
remuneration encourages inventors who appreciate monetary rewards to make additional 29 
 
commercializable inventions, but it may shift their attention from high risk, high return projects to 
work on more incremental and easily commercialized ones. These results indicate that using 
monetary compensation for R&D activities could have limited or counterproductive impacts on R&D 
productivity, and policy makers and managers should therefore exercise caution in promoting 
monetary compensation for inventors.   
From this perspective, it is very important to monitordevelopments after the 2004 amendment  
to the Patent Law, which caused many Japanese firms to change their ways of determining and 
implementing their remuneration policies for employee inventions. It certainly granted more 
bargaining power to employees in R&D divisions and requires more effort by firms to justify their 
pay policies. Table 11 shows how the actual payment of remuneration for employee inventions 
changed after the 2004 amendment . The average payout among 700 actively patenting firms 
increased from ¥7.4 million per firm in 2003 to ¥11.7 million per firm in 2007. This 59 percent 
increase in rewards for inventors within a few years and expectations of further increases in the 
future could have a significant impact on their behavior. More importantly, firms now believe they 
are legally required to explain to their employees how their invention remuneration policies are 
designed. Inventors can see how much monetary reward they could receive through successful R&D 
efforts and will not see the remuneration payouts as windfalls any more. 
What will be the overall impact of the increase in remuneration for employee inventions? There 
are two plausible arguments. First, invention remuneration policies will now be designed more as 30 
 
incentive schemes rather than as measures taken to comply with the Patent Law. Employee 
involvement in designing compensation formulas might also help to enhance the effectiveness of the 
schemes. In the long run, it is also possible that the increased compensation will help to attract 
talented young researchers into industries. If such predictions are borne out, there will be a positive 
impact on the R&D productivity of Japanese firms. 
The second possibility is that, if using monetary compensations for R&D activities could have 
counterproductive impacts on R&D productivity (e.g., cause distortion in project selection as our last 
empirical analysis suggests) and low-powered incentives for inventors are rather optimal, the legally 
enforced introduction of new remuneration policies will simply harm R&D productivity and firm 
profitability. This potential downside of the policy change could be a substantial blow, especially for 
small and medium-sized firms where the issue of equity and the multitasking agency problem could 
be significant. It will take several more years to see the first reliable evaluations of the overall impact 
of the changes to the Patent Law and firms' practices on inventive efforts and R&D productivity 
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Figure 1 Number of firms with revenue-based remuneration policies   
180 184

















1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of firms
 
Data source: Onishi (2010).   
Figure 2 Number of Patent Lawsuits Filed by Employee-Inventors 
   
Note: Includes only lawsuits that had been ruled on by November 2008. 
Source: IP lawsuit database in JIII. 33 
 
Table 1 Employees’ Knowledge of Their Firm’s Inventor Remuneration Policy 
Answers Share 
A majority know our inventor remuneration system to a large extent  10.2% 
A majority know the main items of our inventor remuneration system  6.3% 
A majority know that we have an inventor remuneration system and that its 
details are available for reading 
63.1% 
A majority know that we have an inventor remuneration system  12.9% 
More than a half do not know whether we have an inventor remuneration 
system 
6.6% 
Our firm does not have provisions for inventor remuneration  0.6% 
No response  0.3% 
Note: These are the responses to the question “How much do your employees know about your firm’s policy of 
remuneration for employee inventions to the best of your knowledge?” 
Source: IPO (2003) 
 
 
Table 2 Sample size after matching 
    RIETI Inventor Survey With firm characteristics + With IIP firm survey  + With RIETI II
Number of inventors  5278 4856 2341  584 
Number of firms   1326  217  142 
Number of inventors per firm 
Mean   3.66  10.79  4.11 
Min   1  1  1 
Max     156 156  45 
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Table 3 List of variables 
Variable name  type  Definition 
Dependent variables 
npat category  Number of patents (expected to be) generated from the project surveyed: 1 for 1; 2 for 2 to 5; 
3 for 6 to 10; 4 for 11 to 50; 5 for 51 to 100; 6 for 101 or more 
npat2 binary  Number of patents (expected to be) generated from the project surveyed: 0 for 1 to 5; 1 for 6 
or more 
pat_val category  Economic value of the surveyed patent evaluated on a relative basis by the inventors 
themselves: 1 for "below average"; 2 for "above average"; 3 for "top 25%"; 4 for "top 10%"
pat_val2 binary  Economic value of the surveyed patent evaluated on a relative basis by the inventors 
themselves: 1 for "above average"; 0 for others 
use binary 
Commercial use of the patent: 1 for patented technology being used in the product 
development or production process by the employer, licensed to other firms, or used by 
spin-out employees; 0 otherwise 
Endogenous variables 
fixed_rem  binary  Incidence of filing/registration-based remuneration policy 
rev_rem  binary  Incidence of revenue-based remuneration policy 
perc_fixed_rem  binary  Perceived case of filing/registration-based remuneration policy 
perc_rev_rem  binary  Perceived case of revenue-based remuneration policy 
Independent variables 
mtvn_sci category  Importance of satisfaction from contributing to the progress of science and technology as a 
source of motivation for invention: 5-point scale 
mtvn_chall category  Importance of satisfaction from solving challenging technical problems as a source of 
motivation for invention: 5-point scale 
mtvn_org category  Importance of performance enhancement of employer-organization as a source of 
motivation for invention: 5-point scale 
mtvn_career category  Importance of career advances and better job opportunities as a source of motivation for 
invention: 5-point scale 
mtvn_rep  category  Importance of reputation and prestige as a source of motivation for invention: 5-point scale
mtvn_budget category  Importance of improved research conditions such as higher budgets as a source of 
motivation for invention: 5-point scale 
mtvn_money  category  Importance of monetary rewards as a source of motivation for invention: 5-point scale 
sex  binary  Gender of inventor: =1 if male. 
lnage  discrete  Logarithm of inventor's age 
rdd  binary  Indicator of the inventor's affiliation with an R&D division 
lninventors  discrete  Logarithm of the number of inventors of the patent 
lnmanmonth  discrete  Logarithm of man-months allocated to the project 
seeds binary  Indicator of a seeds-oriented research: answer to the question of whether the motivation of 
the research was to find commercial applications of scientific or technological discoveries  
explore binary  Indicator of a exploratory research: answer to the question of whether the motivation of the 
research was to explore for new technological seeds 
basic  binary  Indicator of basic research 
apply  binary  Indicator of applied research 
dev  binary  Indicator of a development-stage research 
purpose category 
Purpose of the research project: 1 for "to develop a new business", 2 for "to reinforce the 
existing business"; 3 for "to reinforce technical base or grow technical seeds"; 4 for other 
purposes 
education category  Educational background of the inventor: 1 for high school diploma; 2 for 2-year college or 
trade school diploma; 3 for college degree; 4 for master degree; 5 for Ph.D. 
ayear discrete  Application  year  dummies 
myear  discrete  Middle of project period dummies 
ind_code  category  Industry code (sector code set by the Securities Identification Code Committee) 
ussub  category  Subcategory code in the US patent classification. 
lnsale  continuous Logarithm of firm sales 
pat_stock  continuous Patent stock computed assuming 15% depreciation rate 
case_total discrete  Accumulated number of IP lawsuits related to invention remuneration filed by employees in 
the same industry. 35 
 
Figure 3 Firms’ expectations regarding the impacts of drastically increasing the amount of remuneration 
 





Table 4 Discrepancies in firm and employee accounts of remuneration policy 
 
a.  Does your firm have a 
filling/registration-based remuneration 
policy? 
b.  Does your firm have a revenue-based 
remuneration policy? 
   Inventor-employee      Inventor-employee  
    No Yes  Total      No Yes  Total 
Firm  No 1  2  3  Firm No 63  13  76 
 Yes 44  537  581    Yes 206 302  508 





Table 5 Determinants of firm and employee-reported incidence of revenue-based remuneration 
Dependent variable  rev_rem perc_rev_rem 
Unit of observations  Firm ￿ year  Inventor 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
fixed_rem 17.853    20.500                
 (2233.385)    (1909.723)              
lnsale  1.057 *** 1.225 *** 0.110 *** 0.066  
 (0.179)    (0.247)   (0.037)   (0.042)   
pat_stock  0.190 **  0.192 *  -0.007    -0.009   
 (0.088)    (0.104)   (0.018)   (0.019)   
case_total 1.153  *** -0.543     0.022     -0.261   
 (0.210)    (0.675)   (0.040)   (0.173)   
mtvn_sci              0.044     0.040   
              (0.062)   (0.064)   
mtvn_chall              0.025     0.016   
                (0.071)   (0.071)   
mtvn_org               -0.091 *  -0.072  
                (0.054)   (0.055)   
mtvn_career              -0.010     0.013   
                (0.061)   (0.062)   
mtvn_rep              0.044     0.035   
                (0.069)   (0.069)   
mtvn_budget               -0.198 *** -0.189 ***
                (0.061)   (0.061)   
mtvn_money              0.055     0.051   
              (0.057)   (0.056)   
sex              0.416     0.323   
              (0.513)   (0.503)   
lnage               0.644 **  0.657 ** 
              (0.279)   (0.282)   
education=2              0.255     0.258   
              (0.317)   (0.314)   
education=3              0.185     0.127   
              (0.257)   (0.257)   
education=4              0.266     0.290   
              (0.257)   (0.254)   
education=5              0.108     0.183   
                   (0.303)   (0.297)     
Year dummies  Yes   Yes   Yes    Yes   
Industry dummies  No   Yes   No   Yes   
Firm random effect  Yes    Yes    No   No     
Observations 767    767   790     776   
Log Likelihood  -152.09    -126.14     -507.32     -490.51     
All independent variables in Table 3 are included in the estimation but omitted for 
perc_rev_rem. Standard errors are in the parentheses. Standard errors for perc_rev_rem are 
clustered by firms. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 38 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  order probit model  probit model 
   npat  pat_val  npat2  pat_val2  use 
       
fixed_rem  -0.125  -0.516 -0.01 -0.304  -0.341 
  (0.370) (0.326) (0.431) (0.436) (0.363) 
rev_rem 0.096  0.161*  0.180*  0.221**  -0.056 
  (0.082) (0.084) (0.099) (0.090) (0.130) 
mtvn_sci 0.067**  0.176***  0.045  0.166***  -0.051* 
  (0.029) (0.037) (0.036) (0.043) (0.029) 
mtvn_chall 0.04  0.152***  -0.001  0.097*  0.107*** 
  (0.039) (0.057) (0.048) (0.055) (0.040) 
mtvn_org 0.012  0  -0.042  -0.01  -0.022 
  (0.034) (0.037) (0.040) (0.044) (0.034) 
mtvn_career 0.011  -0.025  0.014  0.002  0.009 
  (0.030) (0.040) (0.033) (0.045) (0.037) 
mtvn_rep  -0.017 0.072 -0.044 0.028 0.061* 
  (0.033) (0.050) (0.036) (0.060) (0.034) 
mtvn_budget  0.066** -0.005 0.093** 0.036  -0.093*** 
  (0.029) (0.031) (0.038) (0.035) (0.035) 
mtvn_money  0.012 0.068* 0.021  0.075  0.028 
  (0.030) (0.037) (0.031) (0.048) (0.032) 
sex 0.35  -0.089  0.687***  0.465  -0.112 
  (0.237) (0.226) (0.253) (0.377) (0.192) 
lnage  0.534*** 0.333**  0.431** 0.466***  0.133 
  (0.136) (0.135) (0.182) (0.180) (0.191) 
education=2  0.229 0.105 -0.091 0.045 -0.117 
  (0.161) (0.185) (0.213) (0.263) (0.175) 
education=3  0.203* -0.087  0.04  -0.326* -0.159 
  (0.118) (0.131) (0.131) (0.184) (0.138) 
education=4  0.301** -0.044  0.174  -0.242  -0.221 
  (0.126) (0.137) (0.147) (0.195) (0.166) 
education=5  0.398*** 0.186  0.305** -0.017  -0.215 










  (0.073) (0.092) (0.091) (0.097) (0.096) 
seeds 0.126*  -0.041  0.122  -0.055  -0.113 
  (0.065) (0.074) (0.081) (0.097) (0.080) 
explore 0.262***  0.035  0.232**  0.172  -0.302*** 
  (0.087) (0.104) (0.096) (0.143) (0.102) 
basic 0.131  0.191**  0.261***  0.183*  -0.063 
  (0.083) (0.078) (0.089) (0.108) (0.082) 
apply 0.161***  0.194***  0.147**  0.177**  -0.098 
  (0.053) (0.058) (0.072) (0.074) (0.071) 
dev 0.127  0.157**  0.067  0.066  0.275*** 
  (0.079) (0.071) (0.088) (0.108) (0.063) 
lnsales 0.095***  -0.043*  0.075**  -0.03  -0.048* 
  (0.030) (0.025) (0.034) (0.027) (0.027) 
pat_stock  -0.052** 0.012 -0.064** 0.019  0.04 
  (0.023) (0.021) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) 
time  dummy  yes yes yes yes yes 
US-subclass  dummy  yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 2010  1503  2008  1494  2003 
Log Likelihood  -2609.25  -1800.1  -1139.46  -805.44  -1244.39 
Some independent variables omitted from the table include lninventors, lnmanmonth, technical service dummy, and purpose of the project. Standard errors clustered by firms are in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 





























Table 7 Employee-reported incidence of revenue-based remuneration policy and R&D 
performance measures 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  order probit model  probit model 
   npat  pat_val  npat2  pat_val2  use 
              
perc_fixed_rem 0.022    (0.042)  0.139  0.042  -0.271 
  (0.148) (0.196) (0.210) (0.243) (0.187) 
perc_rev_rem  0.062   0.137   0.029  0.096  0.194* 
  (0.089) (0.095) (0.111) (0.141) (0.099) 
mtvn_sci 0.015  0.118**  -0.043  0.081  -0.099* 
  (0.057) (0.059) (0.072) (0.066) (0.058) 
mtvn_chall  0.117  0.280*** 0.168* 0.292***  0.282*** 
  (0.072) (0.093) (0.092) (0.094) (0.081) 
mtvn_org -0.017  -0.135**  -0.08  -0.169**  -0.065 
  (0.048) (0.058) (0.059) (0.072) (0.048) 
mtvn_career 0.141***  0.088  0.093  0.114  -0.014 
  (0.042) (0.070) (0.059) (0.081) (0.058) 
mtvn_rep -0.024  -0.028  -0.083  -0.079  0.023 
  (0.044) (0.058) (0.059) (0.079) (0.053) 
mtvn_budget -0.022  0.021  0.075  0.065  -0.059 
  (0.051) (0.053) (0.062) (0.070) (0.063) 
mtvn_money 0.007  0.041  0.029  0.02  0.004 
  (0.047) (0.060) (0.056) (0.078) (0.058) 
sex 0.501  -0.455  1.059**  -0.217  -1.057*** 
  (0.413) (0.417) (0.533) (0.543) (0.352) 
lnage 0.525**  0.472*  0.514  0.864**  -0.194 
  (0.240) (0.275) (0.331) (0.353) (0.306) 
education=2  0.449 -0.017 0.319 -0.069 0.136 
  (0.292) (0.298) (0.360) (0.439) (0.379) 
education=3 0.163  0.196  0.086  -0.052  0.044 
  (0.230) (0.233) (0.270) (0.341) (0.245) 
education=4 0.177  -0.011  0.152  -0.322  -0.008 
  (0.227) (0.242) (0.283) (0.338) (0.239) 
education=5 0.478*  0.252  0.296  0.312  -0.405 
  (0.272) (0.258) (0.329) (0.387) (0.312) 
rdd 0.202  0.075  0.265  0.152  -0.383** 
  (0.129) (0.152) (0.170) (0.169) (0.150) 
seeds 0.194**  -0.042  0.246**  -0.075  -0.08 
  (0.098) (0.103) (0.115) (0.136) (0.137) 
explore 0.123  -0.340*  0.082  -0.179  -0.137 
  (0.150) (0.189) (0.172) (0.234) (0.180) 
basic 0.292**  0.329***  0.294**  0.270*  0.034 
 (0.115)  (0.123)  (0.148)  (0.162)  (0.144) 
apply 0.203**  0.249***  0.133  0.354***  -0.071 
  (0.095) (0.087) (0.105) (0.127) (0.099) 
dev 0.222*  0.209*  0.258*  0.309**  0.222** 
 (0.119)  (0.113)  (0.147)  (0.142)  (0.109) 
lnsales 0.034  -0.008  0.059  0.028  -0.082** 
  (0.037) (0.039) (0.046) (0.055) (0.039) 
pat_stock -0.042  0.035  -0.077**  0.023  0.033 
    (0.033) (0.042) (0.038) (0.040) (0.034) 
time dummy  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
US-subclass dummy  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  788 604 780 595 778 
Log Likelihood  -978  -706.69  -428.51  -315.81  -465.75 
Some independent variables omitted from the table include lninventors, lnmanmonth, technical service 
dummy, and purpose of the project. Standard errors clustered by firms are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table 8 Probit regresson and propensity score matching estimates of the effect of 





variable  probit PSM 








 -0.022    -0.012   
   
use 
(0.052) (0.044) 








 0.077*  0.086** 
   
use 
(0.039) (0.041) 
Nearest neighbor matching was selected as the matching procedure. The treatment 
effect computed from the probit estimates is based on the mean values for all 
independent variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses in probit model and bootstrapped standard 
errors in parentheses in PSM. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 9 Estimation of revenue-based remuneration policy and R&D performance 
measures using probit model with instrumental variables 
(6) (7) (8)
npat2 pat_val2 use
perc_fixed_rem 0.04 0.03 -0.249
(0.223) (0.265) (0.203)
perc_rev_rem -0.277 -0.16 0.046
(0.316) (0.378) (0.323)
mtvn_sci -0.05 0.098 -0.062
(0.088) (0.081) (0.067)
mtvn_chall 0.254** 0.251** 0.230**
(0.113) (0.104) (0.092)
mtvn_org -0.065 -0.154* -0.057
(0.068) (0.086) (0.055)
mtvn_career 0.071 0.031 -0.027
(0.069) (0.078) (0.064)
mtvn_rep -0.084 -0.072 0.052
(0.068) (0.095) (0.063)
mtvn_budget 0.022 0.152* -0.067
(0.068) (0.083) (0.077)
money 0.073 0.078 -0.008
(0.068) (0.086) (0.065)
sex 0.956* -0.106 -1.008***
(0.499) (0.603) (0.298)
lage 0.865** 0.846** -0.294
(0.387) (0.394) (0.357)
education=2 0.475 0.044 -0.086
(0.424) (0.517) (0.439)
education=3 0.29 -0.186 -0.297
(0.339) (0.423) (0.296)
education=4 0.29 -0.448 -0.33
(0.349) (0.413) (0.276)
education=5 0.462 0.132 -0.839**
(0.413) (0.445) (0.379)
rdd 0.346* 0.009 -0.471***
(0.187) (0.194) (0.156)
seeds 0.246** -0.415 0.019
(0.121) (0.265) (0.158)
explore 0.03 0.263 -0.204
(0.182) (0.175) (0.200)
basic 0.216 0.407*** 0.145
(0.168) (0.151) (0.175)
apply 0.137 0.266 -0.137
(0.122) (0.164) (0.107)
dev 0.24 -0.034 0.196*
(0.170) (0.230) (0.112)
lnsales 0.077 -0.017 -0.024
(0.060) (0.045) (0.053)
pat_stock -0.082* -5.354*** 0.072
(0.047) (1.923) (0.045)
time dummy yes yes yes
US-subclass dummy yes yes yes
Observations 639 482 639
Log Likelihood -705.42 -516.13 -730.65
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Some independent variables omitted from the table include lninventors,
lnmanmonth, technical service dummy, and purpose of the project.
Standard errors clustered by firms are in parentheses.
probit model with IV
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Table 10 Estimation of revenue-based remuneration policy and R&D performance 
measures among inventors who preferred monetary rewards 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
npat2 pat_val2 use npat2 pat_val2 use
perc_rev_rem 0.039 0.058 0.093 -0.412 -1.016*** 0.672*
(0.140) (0.161) (0.120) (0.376) (0.303) (0.383)
perc_fixed_rem 0.483* -0.331 -0.510* 0.441 -0.166 -0.45
(0.257) (0.316) (0.295) (0.272) (0.322) (0.312)
mtvn_sci 0.128 -0.011 -0.164** 0.061 0.024 -0.190**
(0.098) (0.092) (0.077) (0.116) (0.093) (0.081)
mtvn_chall 0.215* 0.247** 0.283** 0.303** 0.199 0.235*
(0.123) (0.123) (0.112) (0.147) (0.130) (0.130)
mtvn_org -0.05 -0.165* -0.043 -0.034 -0.148 0.008
(0.074) (0.098) (0.066) (0.086) (0.104) (0.075)
mtvn_career -0.102 0.115 -0.078 -0.103 0.055 -0.114
(0.078) (0.109) (0.084) (0.087) (0.111) (0.090)
mtvn_rep 0.007 0.083 -0.052 -0.002 0.176* 0.003
(0.090) (0.102) (0.077) (0.104) (0.098) (0.087)
mtvn_bu dget 0.148 0.091 0.077 0.098 0.103 0.113
(0.091) (0.096) (0.070) (0.101) (0.113) (0.086)
sex 0.715 -0.35 -0.939 0.568 -0.887 -1.084*
(0.536) (0.544) (0.587) (0.523) (0.600) (0.614)
lage 0.278 0.852* 0.112 0.666 0.693 -0.445
(0.413) (0.438) (0.339) (0.467) (0.473) (0.383)
education=2 -0.572 -0.866 0.216 -0.176 -0.79 -0.267
(0.595) (0.585) (0.472) (0.675) (0.680) (0.571)
education=3 0.204 -0.12 0.322 0.581 -0.146 -0.447
(0.319) (0.441) (0.329) (0.392) (0.633) (0.418)
education=4 0.308 -0.675 0.262 0.559 -0.743 -0.408
(0.329) (0.431) (0.349) (0.371) (0.591) (0.432)
education=5 0.452 -0.041 0.088 0.797 -0.04 -0.594
(0.376) (0.505) (0.419) (0.494) (0.670) (0.578)
rdd -0.101 0.332 -0.422** 0.034 0.016 -0.550***
(0.216) (0.259) (0.201) (0.255) (0.279) (0.201)
seeds 0.293* 0.041 -0.063 0.204 0.014 -0.004
(0.156) (0.173) (0.156) (0.168) (0.181) (0.192)
explore 0.099 -0.099 -0.082 -0.075 -0.408 -0.087
(0.238) (0.281) (0.248) (0.237) (0.326) (0.315)
basic 0.202 0.134 -0.159 0.232 0.203 0.13
(0.182) (0.240) (0.213) (0.220) (0.318) (0.270)
apply -0.003 0.569*** -0.083 0.026 0.816*** -0.352*
(0.162) (0.167) (0.139) (0.208) (0.186) (0.188)
dev 0.328* 0.273 0.172 0.341 0.249 0.122
(0.185) (0.170) (0.150) (0.215) (0.171) (0.155)
lnsales 0.039 0.126* -0.08 0.091 0.230*** -0.034
(0.052) (0.067) (0.051) (0.064) (0.070) (0.070)
pat_stock -0.047 0.016 0.05 -0.097* -0.01 0.066
(0.043) (0.051) (0.043) (0.052) (0.044) (0.059)
time dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
US-subclass dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 504 387 499 415 318 415
Log Likelihood -265.51 -198.15 -292.05 -443.56 -318.69 -454.8
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
probit model IV probit model
Some independent variables omitted from the table include lninventors, lnmanmonth, technical service dummy, and




Table 11 Firms paying invention remuneration and average payouts 
 